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[Cl'im. No. 7368. In Bank. March 20, 1964.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARL ALl"RED QUJ CKE, Defendaut and Appellant.
[1] Homicide-First Degree Murder-Deliberation and Premeditation.-To !<upport a fil'!'1 d('I:P'('(' murder v(!rdict direct evidene(' of n ddibeTllt~ and prl'lIwditated purpose to kill is not
required. The nI'C('!I!<nry elements of deliberation andpl'ellll'ditntion may bl' infernoil from proof of such facts and circulllstnnces as will furnish a re:lsollable foundation for sucll an
inference.
•
[2] Id.-Evidence-First Degree Murder.-A verdict of first de. gree murder in a prosecution for the ldlling of a girl was
supported h~' evidl'nee thnt dl'fendant spent the aftf'rnoon of
the dny of the crimI' looJ,inp: for. ~ir]!;, that he WIIS ('ontemplating s('xlwl irtt<'l'(,Olll'!<", 1hat he followed the !;allle pro(,I'dure with tIl(' vidiJlI that hI' had uf<ed l'uel'eflsfnJly two weeks
before with another /.!'irl ",110 ('npitulnted beclluse lwr life WIiS
thr('atell('(l, nnd that h(' I']l~ag('d in intereourl'e nfter the victim was dl'nd, thus iudicating that defendant., on precollcl'ived
reflection, dl'liberntely formed a plan to coerce the victim into
engl1~ing in illt(')·cOUl'!'(, with him while she was nlive, or if
that failed, to kill h{'r to satisfy his desires Witll her corpse.
{S] Criminal Law-Conduct of Judge-Remarks to Jury.-A
judge's r(,JIl11l'ks to a jury nfter it had returned a vl'rdict
imposin~ the dl'nth pellalty cOllllllending the jurors on their
fortitude and cOllllllellting that he sincerely felt it was the
only verdict they could return Rnd be fair to society did not
show bias, but mel'el;y r('flected an opinion formed by the court
after henring all the t<,!'till1on~' nnd observing the witnesses.
[4] Id.-New Trial-Hearing and Determination.-That the trial
court, in denying defendant'!; motion for a new trial, stated
that it agJ'eed with the jury's verdiet finding defendant guilty
of first degree murder, but did not state its concurrence in the
jury's finding that deft'ndnnt was legally sane, did not indicate that the court failed to review the evidence, nor was it
sufficient to rebut the presumption that the court performed
its duty, where there was ample evidence of defendant's
sanity, thus probably leading the court to believe it was unneeessa~'y to indicate its assent to the sanity verdict.
[1] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, §§ 86, 87, 172 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Homicide (1st cd §§ 42, 464, 46c).
Melt. Dig. References: [1] HOillil'ide, § 15(2); r2] HOll1ieide,
~ 145(3); [3] Criminal Law, § 329(1); [4] Criminal Law, § 969;
[5] Criminal Law, § 1011.1.
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[5] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for' Determining Penalty-Instructions.-On the penalty phase of a first degree murder
case, it was re\"ersible errOl· to instruct that the jury, in
making its determination as to the penalty to be imposed,
could eonsider the possibility that a defendant sentenced
either to death or life imprisonment Dlay be pardoned or have
his sentence reduced by the Governor, and that a prisoner
serving a life sentence may be paroled after serYing at least
seven years, where, from a discussion between the jury and
the trial judge after the jury had deliberated for several
hours, it wa;; clear that the jury chose the death penalty because of its misgivings as to the success of the Adult Authority in protecting society and its quulifications to do so.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County. Ronald M. Crookshank, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Prosecution for murder. JUdgment of conviction imposing the death penalty reversed insofar as it relates to the
penalty and in all other respects affirmed.
Frank L. Williams, Jr., Public Defender, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAY1\OR, .J.-A jury found defendant guilty of murder
in the first degree, found that he was sane at the time of the
killing, and fixed the penalty at deatll. The trial court denied
a motion for new trial. The appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code,
§ 1239, subd. (b).)
Defendant, 18 years old, left his home in Lompoc in the
early morning of Xovember 8, 1962, to look for work. He was
unable to find work and drove to Orange, where he arrived in
the early afternoon. He stopped repeatedly to put water into
his aut~mobile. which was overheating because of a leak in
the radiator. From Orange he went to Santiago Canyon,
where he once Ii.ed. During the course of the afternoon he
spent considerable time looking for girls. He told a young
male friend that "he was going to get a piece before he left
the canyon" and that be was "going to get a piece from V" a local girl. He tried unsuccessfully to find this girl
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and several other girls he had known in Santiago Canyon. He
then remembered Susan Nash, the victim, with whom he had
gone to school. At about 6 :30 or 7 o'clock in the evening he
called on her at her home, and she agreed to go with him to a
drive-in movie.
According to defendant's extrajudicial statements and his
testimony at the trial, he and :Mis.') Nash went to the drive-in
theater, left there at about 1 a.m. and drove in the direction
of :Miss Nash's home. On the way up the canyon the automobile overheated, and df'f{'ndant stopped at the side of the
road. After talking for a few minutes, defendant put his
right arm aroulld :Miss Nasll and tri{'d to kiss her. She resisted, saying "she didn't kiss 011 the first date." D('fendant
placed his right hand tightly over her mouth and nose,
pulled her toward him and held her. 'Yhen she attempted to
attract the attention of a passing motorist by blowing the
horn, defelldant puned her hand from the horn ring and in
doing so broke the ring. She got free after a struggle and
asked to be taken llOme. 'Vhen defendant refused, she asked
"'Vhat kind of girl do you think I am'" Defendant replied
that he thought she was a "very nice girl." She then said,
"'Well, you sure aren't acting like it." Defendant again
placed his hand over her mouth and nose, and shortly thereafter began to strangle her. He released her once and finding
that she was gasping for air, strangled her again until "she
just didn't seem tllat she was breathing any more. "
Although defendant thought :Miss Nash was dead, he removed his belt, "looped it around her neck," and pulled it
tight. He then drove 6 miles to a more isolated area, spent
several minutes smoking, and after fondling the body, undressed it and took off most of his own clothes. He pulled the
body into the back seat where he fondled the "agina, bit a
br{'ast, and had sexual intercourse with the body.
Approximately two llOurs later two police officers noticed
the parked automobile and found defendant asleep in the
back seat with the body. Defendant willingly made several
statements, wllich were tape-recorded, relating the events of
the evening. He denied intending to have intercourse with
tIle victim before he killed ller and denied intending to kill
her. He e.xplained that llis behavior was caused by llis having
been jilted frequently and by his being angered by the victim's rE'fusal to kiss him. j
At t1le trial dpfendant anmittNl that two weeks bpfore the
killing he had smothpred anothp.r girl by holding his hand
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tightly over her mouth and nose until she agreed to engage in
sexual intercourse with him. This girl testified that she accepted defendant'8 invitation to go to a drive-in movie and
that he refused to take her home after the movie, saying that
he wanted "to go riding for a while." He then took her to
an isolated area, where he attempted to kiss her and asked
her to get into the back seat of his automobile. She refused to
kiss him, stating that she had a sore throat from tonsilitis.
Defendant placed his hand over her mouth and nose making
it '~hard to breatlJe." She testified that she was so frightened that she agreed to get into the back seat and do w11at he
wanted.
Defendant contends that since he testified tllat he did not
intend to ki1l or to rape and cllOked the victim only because
he was frustrated and angered by her refusal to kiss him alld
since tIl ere was no direct testimony as to his state of mind,
the evidence does not support a finding of intentional, premeditated killing or of killing in the perpetration of rape.
[1] To support tIle verdict, however, "direct eyidt.'lIce or
a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill is not required.
The necessary elements of deliberation and premeditation
may be inferred from proof ofsueb facts and circumstances
as will furnish a reasonable foundation for such an inference." (People v. Oartier, 54 Cal.2d 300, 305-306 [5 Cal.
Rptr. 573,353 P.2d53].) A findillg of specific intent to rape
may also be bascd on inferences from the evidence. (People v.
Oheary,48 Cal.2d 301, 310 [309 P.2d 431]; see also People v.
Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88, 93 [10 Ca1.Rptr.167, 358 P.2d 295, 83
A.L.R.2d 1086] ; People v. Lot.'c, 53 Ca1.2d 843, 850-851 [3 Cal.
Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705].)
[2] The evidence supports the verdict of murder in the
first degree on the ground that the killing was intentional
and premeditated or that it was done in tIle perpetration of
rape. Defendant spent the afternoon of tIle killing in Santiago Canyon looking for gir1s. That he was contemplating
sexual intercourse is shown by his stateme~t that he was
"going to get a piece before he left the canyon" and b~· his
seeldng the girl he said he was going to get it from. Defendant followed the same procedure witll tIle victim tl1at ]Ie had
used successfully two weeks before. At the point where her
predecesso\- capitulated because her life WfiR threatened. the
victim remained adamant, and defendant killed her. He then
drove to It less travelled arit!a and took considprable paim; to
arrange the corpse for intercourse. The similarity in details
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of the two evenings, the fact that the defendant used such
force as to threaten the first girl's life, the fact that he
engaged in intercourse after the victim was dead, and the
circumstances indicating that he went to Santiago Canyon
with tIle intention of having sexual intercourse, support the
inference that upon preconceived reflection he deliberately
formed a plan to coerce the victim into engaging in intercourse witll him while she was alive, or if that failed, to kill
her to satisfy his desires with her corpse.
Defendant concedes that under the M'Naughton test, the
evidence adduced at the sanity trial is sufficient to support
the jury's finding that he was legally sane,1 but contends
that we s110uid replace tl1at test by the one proposed in 1962
by the Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal
Offenders. 2 We are not persuaded to do so, }lOwever, and
adhere to our numerous decisions on the subject. (People v.
Nash, 52 Ca1.2d 36, 48 [338 P.2d 416] ; People v. Darling, 58
Ca1.2d 15, 22-23 [22 Ca1.Rptr. 484. 372 P.2d 316] ; People v.
Rittger, 54 Cal.2d 720, 732 [7 Cal.Rptr. 901, 355 P.2d 645] ;
People v. Berry, 44 Ca1.2d 426.433 [282 P.2d 861]; People v.
Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876. 8f14 [256 P.2d 911].)
Defendant contends t1111t the trial judge was biased and
that he failed to review the evidence as required by section
1181 of the Penal Code before passing on a motion for new
trial. (People y. Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 728 [16 Ca1.Rptr. 777,
17 Ca1.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809] ; People v. Moore, 53 Cal
2d 451,454 [348 P.2d 584].)
[3] When the jury returned its verdict imposing the
death penalty, the court commended the jurors on their forHtude and stated, "I sincerely feel it's the only verdict you
('ould return and be fair to society." This statement does Dot
IOn the basis of defendant's history, a personal interview with him,
and a medical examination, each psychiatrist concluded that though
defendant suffered from a sociopathic personality disorder, he was
legally sane at the time of the killing. The only evidenee that defendant
did not know the nature and quality of his act or that it was wrong was
a statement by deft'ndant report.ed by two of the psychiatrists that when
he strangled the victim he did not know what he was doing. Defendant
told the third doctor, however, that he strangled her. beeallse he was
angered by her refusal to kiss him.
2" A person is not criminally responsible for an act if, ..t the time
of the commission of such act, as a lIIubstantinl consequence of mental
disorder, lIe did not have adequate capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated."
Spt'eial Commissions on Insanity and Criminal Offenders, First Rt'port,
July 7. 1962, State of California, Sncramento, California, pp. 15, 48.
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show bias, but merely reflects an opinion formed by the court
after hearing all the testimony and observing the witnesses.
There is nothing in the comment to suggest that the judge
was prejudiced against defendant or that his opinion was so
firmly settled that he could not objectively reappraise the
evidence. (Cf. McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 172 Cal.
6,9-11 [155 P. 86J.)
.
[4] Defendant contends, however, that the court did not
in fact review the evidence. After denying defendant's mo·
tion for new trial without comment, the court, in summarizing the proceedings before passing judgment, stated that the
jury had found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and that the court agreed with this finding. Thus the
court indicated its independent approval of t11at verdict. The
court, however, did not state its concurrence in the jury's
finding that defendant was legally sane. Defendant points to
this omission as evidence to support his claim that the trial
court did not review the evidence relating to defendant's
sanity.
The court's failure to state its agreement with the jury's
finding was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the
court performed its duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 15;
see People v. Hooton, 53 Cal.2d 85, 88 [346 P.2d 199].)
Moreover, the only witnesses at the sanity trial, three courtappointed psychiatrists, unanimously agreed that defendant
was legally sane. Two of the psychiatrists noted that defendant had stated to them that he did not know what he was
doing when he strangled the victim, but defendant told the
third doctor that he had strangled her because 11e was angered
by her refusal to ki~s him. It was probably because of the
ample evidence of defendant's sanity that the court did not
find it necessary to indicate its assent to the jury's verdict.
[5] At the penalty trial the court instructed the jury
that" In making your determination as to the penalty to be
imposed, you may consider that the laws of California provide that a defendant sentenced either to death or life imprisonment ma., be pardoned or have his sentence reduced by
the Governor and that a prisoner serving a life sentence may
be paroled, but not until he has served at least seven years. "
In People v. Morse, 60 Ca1.2d 631, 643 [36 Ca1.Rptr. 201, 388
P.2d 33], we held such an instruction erroneous on the
ground that the ., function of the jury is to consider the facts
surrounding the crime and deft'ndant '8 background, and upon
that basis, reach its dt'cision. The jury s110uld not be invited to decide if the defendant will be fit for release in the
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future; it should not at all be involved in the issue of the
time, if any, when the defendant, should be released; it
should not be propelled into weighing the possible consequences of the Authority's administrative action." We have
no doubt in the present case that the error was prejudicial.
The jurors indicated that their decision on the penalty was
dependent on their evaluation of •• the success of the Adult
Authority in protecting society." After several hours of deliberation on the penalty, the jury returned to the courtroom
to ask several questions B and also to request that Mr. Spangler, the administrative officer of the Adult Authority, be recalled. These questions and the request to recall Mr. Spangler
demonstrate the jurors' concern with the possibility of defendant's being paroled if given a life sentence and with the
likelihood of recidivism if he were paroled. The jury retired
and returned somewhat later when, in response to an inquiry
by the court, the foreman indicated that the jury was evenly
divided and a verdict seemed "unlikely." He explained the
jury's difficulties in the following discussion with the court:
"MR. PEIRCE: . . . The reason we are requesting additional
information is to help satisfy the concern of various people
for various interests in the matter, the protection of society.
THE COURT: I understand. MR. PEmcE: Things of this
nature ... it's a sort of technical type legal discussion thing.
I would like to tell you a little further about--not about why
the feelings exist, but about what kinds of concern are evidenced by members of the Jury on one side or the other and
explain, if possible, why I and others feel that other information would be helpful in reaching a decision. THE COURT:
All right, you may do so. MR. PEIRCE; One of' the concerns
that seems to be evidenced is what-well, one of the questions
we asked was a statistical sort of a thing and the reason for
that question was to determine further in our own minds
what the qualifications were of the California Adult Authority in, let's say, what is the degree of success, its degree of
success had been from a historical standpoint in protecting
8(a) "The first-degree murder, what percentages suffer eoeiopathie
eharaetert ..
(b) "First-degree murder, what pereentage eommit major erimes,
meaning murder of the first or seeond degree or felonies after their
first parole t ..
•
(e) "First-degree murderers suffering from lIoeiopathie eharaeter,
what pereentage eommitted major erimes after their first parolet"
(d) "What is the ratio of death penalties versus life imprisonment
for first-degree murder eonvietionst"
&1CJId.....
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society in similar circumstances as we are in here. THE
COURT: Of course, the trouble is each ease is very individual. You can't look in the book and come up with the answer.
MR. PEIRCE: Well, suppose, for eXample, that crimes of
similar nature had been committed in the past. We were wondering if information is available on what sort of chances for
success, rehabilitation were evident from information about
the behavior of people who have been in similar situations, in
prison for a term and then released; .information about the
duration of confinement for persons convicted of similar
crimes, the nature and extent of psychological help that
might be available to thcm. In other words, what chances
were offered, what facilities, what personnel were available
for psychological .assistance to a person in need of that'
Let's see, some of tlle other kinds of things that were crossing our minds. I guess that expressed in general the t~"P(' of
information 've thought would help us on reaching a conclusion about the-I guess I could say the success of the Adult
Authority in protecting society, hopefully, once again, based
on crimes of similar nature. THE COURT: I don't know
what I can add to what I have already said. You haven't
deliberated very long today, I will let you deliberate a little
longer, then I will talk to you again." Three and one-half
hours later the jury returned with its verdict.
It is clear from tIle foregoing discussion that the jury
chose the death penalty because of its misgivings as to the
success of the Adult Authority in protecting society and its
qualifications to do so. A new trial on the issue of penalty is
therefore necessary.
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to the penalty. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., eoncurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the reasoning of the
opinion authored by Mr. Justice Traynor; in the affirmance
of the judgment in all respects other than as to penalty; and
in the reversal of the judgment insofar as it . relates to tht'
penalty phas~ because of the instruction on possibility of
parole and possibility of pardon or reduction of sentence by
the Go,'ernor, the giving of which we held to be in error in
People v. Morse (1964) 60 Ca1.2d 631, 636 [la]-653 [ld] [36
Ca1.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33]. However. in weighing the effect
of that error (i.t'., articulating the basis for our conclusion of
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prejudice), Justice Traynur's opinion appears to stress only
the fact thL~ the jury interrupted their deliberations to ask
several questions relating to the probability of defendant'R
being paroled and the likelilJOod of recidh'ism in sue}) evcnt.
In concurring, I empl)asize t11at tlle record before us also
contains the two other elements accentuated in Morse (at
pp. 652-653 [6a] of 60 Ca 1.2d) as eontributing to the totality
"of the rntire cause" (Ca1. Const., art VI, § 41,6) upon "'hich
totality we found prejudicial effect of the crror: i.e., (1) the
fact that (as Justicc Traynor impliedly recognizes by referring to the jury's request to "recall" the witness Spangler)
a substantial mass of evidence was introduced as to the asserted statistical averages of prison terms aetually served by
persons sentenced to life imprisonment for first degre(' murder, and (2) the faet tJlIlt the prosecntor (and likewise defenRC'
counsel) commented at length on this material in argument
to the jury. I conclude that all of these elements (i.e., the
totality "of the entire eause" as contemplated by the explicit mandate of our Constitution) combine to make it appear "reasonably probable t])at a reRult more favorable to
defendant as to pcnalty would have been reached in the absence of thE' error." (People Y. Morse (1964) supra, 60
Ca1.2d 631, 653 [6a] : People v. Watson (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818,
835 [12] - 838 [13] [299 P.2d 243].)
McCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting-I would affirm
the judgment in itc;; entirety. (See my concurring and disRentin~ opinion in People v. Hines, post, p. 182 [37 Cal.Rptr.
622,390 P.2d 398].)
RE'spondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 15,
1964. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.
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